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ABSTRACT
We analyze the setting of monetary and nonmonetary policies in monetary unions. We show
that in these unions a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free-
rider problem in the setting of nonmonetary policies, such as labor market policy, fiscal policy, and
bank regulation. The free-rider problem leads the union’s members to pursue lax nonmonetary
policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation. The free-rider problem can
be mitigated by imposing constraints on the nonmonetary policies, like unionwide rules on labor
market policy, debt constraints on members’ fiscal policy, and unionwide regulation of banks. When
there is no time inconsistency problem, there is no free-rider problem, and constraints on
nonmonetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful.
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pkehoe@res.mpls.frb.fed.usIn the last decade, there has been growing interest in the design of monetary unions–
groups of political units (countries or states or provinces) that have a great deal of indepen-
dence in setting ﬁscal and other nonmonetary policies, but that share a central monetary
authority, which sets a single monetary policy for all the members of the union. In practice,
some monetary unions have worked poorly while others have worked well. Argentina is an
example of an unsuccessful one; the United States, a successful one; and the jury is still out
on the European Union. Why are some monetary unions successful and others not? Here
we develop a theory that answers this question.
The time inconsistency problem in monetary policy is at the heart of our theory.
We argue that this monetary policy problem leads to a free-rider problem in the setting
of nonmonetary policies. Free-riding union members pursue ineﬃciently lax nonmonetary
policies that beneﬁt them individually, but that induce the monetary authority to generate
high inﬂation. One way to eliminate both problems is to directly solve the time inconsistency
problem in monetary policy. As is well-known, this problem can be eliminated with either
commitment or reputational mechanisms. When either type of mechanism is in place, there
is no free-rider problem, so that solving the time inconsistency problem indirectly eliminates
the free-rider problem. In practice, of course, it is diﬃcult to change the degree of eﬀective
commitment, say, by developing a reputation. For our purposes, we will take as given whether
or not a monetary authority has a time inconsistency problem.
More interestingly, solving the free-rider problem helps mitigate the time inconsistency
problem in monetary policy. The free-rider problem can be solved by imposing constraints
on nonmonetary policies, such as unionwide rules on labor market policies, debt constraints
on ﬁscal policy, and unionwide regulation of banks.
We ﬁrst make these points in a general theoretical setup. Our setup has governments
who set nonmonetary policies noncooperatively, competitive private agents and a benevolent
monetary authority that chooses inﬂation. The monetary authority’s optimal inﬂation ratedepends on the decisions of private agents and on the nonmonetary policies. Private agents
make their decisions anticipating the choice of the monetary authority. Governments choose
their nonmonetary policies anticipating the choices of both private agents and the monetary
authority.
We show that the free-rider problem in our setup is quite diﬀerent from those in the
literature. In the standard free-rider problem the agents are directly linked because the
actions of each agent directly aﬀect the payoﬀs of other agents. We have no such direct links.
In our setup the nonmonetary policies of the governments aﬀect the common inﬂation rate
and thus indirectly aﬀect the payoﬀs of other governments. One might think that this indirect
link suﬃces to generate a free-rider problem. It does not because of an envelope argument:
the monetary authority chooses inﬂation optimally so that, at the margin, an incremental
change in inﬂation has no eﬀect on welfare. Thus, when a government is contemplating
a change in its nonmonetary policies away from the cooperative benchmark, the induced
eﬀects of its policies on the welfare of other countries is zero.
In our setup forward-looking private agents are the source of the free-rider problem. A
change in government policy in some country makes the private agents in all the countries
predict a change in inﬂation, and this predicted change makes them change their actions.
Because each government cares about the decisions of its private agents, a change in gov-
ernment policy in any country aﬀects welfare in all countries. This indirect link results in a
free-rider problem. If private agents’ decisions do not depend on their forecasts of inﬂation
then this link is broken and there is no free-rider problem. Of course, if private agents’
decisions do not depend on their forecasts of inﬂation then there is no time inconsistency
problem to begin with.
With commitment by the monetary authority, the setting of nonmonetary policies
does not induce changes in the inﬂation rate, and there is no free-rider problem. Thus, the
presence or absence of a free-rider problem in nonmonetary policies is intimately connected
2to the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy.
After detailing this theory, we consider applications to three types of nonmonetary
policies: labor market policy, ﬁscal policy, and bank regulation.
We ﬁrst apply our theory to labor market policy. T od os o ,w em o d i f yt h ec l a s s i c
model of time inconsistency in monetary policy (due to Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983)). In our modiﬁcation of this classic model, governments determine
the natural rate of unemployment by their setting of labor market policies. We show that
the free-rider problem leads governments to adopt policies that result in excessively high
unemployment and inﬂation.
We then apply our theory to ﬁscal policy. We consider a simple dynamic model with
many countries united in a monetary union. Each country’s ﬁscal authority issues nominal
debt to outside risk-neutral lenders. After that, the union’s monetary authority decides on
the common inﬂation rate. The monetary authority balances inﬂation’s beneﬁts (devalued
nominal debt) against its costs (lower output). The larger the debt the monetary authority
inherits, the higher it sets the inﬂation rate.
The ﬁscal authorities balance the consumption-smoothing gains from issuing debt
against the induced costs of higher inﬂa t i o no nt h e i ro w no u t p u t . E a c hc o u n t r y ’ sﬁscal
authority ignores the induced costs of inﬂation on output in other countries. Thus, relative
to a cooperative benchmark, each ﬁscal authority issues too much debt, which leads the
monetary authority to create too much inﬂation, which in turn leads to an ineﬃciently low
level of output for all members of the union.
If there is some mechanism through which the monetary authority can eﬀectively com-
mit to its policy, then there is no free-rider problem. In practice, though, such commitment
is often not available, and monetary unions have typically chosen to attack the free-rider
problem directly. One way of doing so is to impose constraints on the amount of debt that
the union members can issue. In our example, appropriately chosen constraints solve the
3free-rider problem.
Finally, we apply our theory to bank regulation. We develop a simple dynamic bank-
ing model with many countries united in a monetary union. Each country’s government
regulates the riskiness of banks’ portfolios. When banks cannot fully pay oﬀ depositors,
the monetary authority prints money to pay the residual amount, thus increasing inﬂation.
Each government balances the costs of bank regulation against the induced costs of inﬂa-
tion resulting from bank bailouts. In doing so, the governments ignore the induced costs of
inﬂation on other members of the union. These forces thus generate a free-rider problem in
which regulation of banks is lax, bank bailouts are too frequent, and the rate of inﬂation is
excessive, all compared to eﬃcient levels. If there is no mechanism available to solve the time
inconsistency problem directly, then the free-rider problem in this model can be mitigated
with mutually agreed upon constraints on bank regulation.
Why are some monetary unions successful and others not? Our theory suggests that
monetary unions are likely to fail when there is a time inconsistency problem in monetary
policy and constraints on nonmonetary policies are either not present or not eﬀective.
Argentina is an example of a monetary union which has a serious time inconsistency
problem with its monetary policy and which, regardless of its good intentions, is unable
to set eﬀective constraints on its members. Argentina’s provincial governments routinely
run budget deﬁcits that end up being ﬁnanced by the central bank. Nicolini et al. (2000)
demonstrate that Argentina’s monetary authority has routinely bailed out the provincial
governments when they have run into ﬁscal diﬃculties. Now bailouts are expected, which has
increased the provinces’ incentives to behave imprudently. Indeed, one rationalization of the
convertibility law which linked Argentina’s peso to the U.S. dollar is the hope of restraining
the ﬁnancial proﬂigacy of provincial governments. Jones et al. (2000) show some evidence
that provincial ﬁscal deﬁcits fell after the imposition of convertibility, though the recent
collapse of the currency board suggests that the time inconsistency problems in monetary
4policy are still present. For related discussions of Argentina, see the work of Cooper and
Kempf (2001a and b) and Tommasi et al. (2001).
The United States is an example of a successful monetary union. This union of states
appears to have solved the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy, so that there is
no free-rider problem.
The success of the European Monetary Union is not yet clear. Our theory provides one
rationale for the ﬁscal policy restrictions in the treaty establishing this union (the Maastricht
Treaty) and in the recent Stability and Growth Pact among its members. One reading of
the Maastricht Treaty, notwithstanding the solemn expressions of intent of the primacy of
price stability, is that monetary policy is to be set sequentially by majority rule. As such,
the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy is potentially severe. In such a scenario,
our analysis shows that debt constraints are desirable. Our analysis is consistent with the
view that the framers of the Maastricht Treaty thought commitment to monetary policy was
extremely diﬃcult to achieve and therefore wisely included debt constraints as an integral
part of the treaty and the pact.
An alternative reading of the Maastricht Treaty is that the primacy of the goal of
price stability and the independence of the central bank eﬀectively ensure commitment to
monetary policy and thereby solve the time inconsistency problem. Under this reading–
as our analysis with commitment indicates–debt constraints are unnecessary and possibly
harmful. (For a forceful argument that debt constraints are harmful, see Buiter et al.’s 1993
work.)
Other monetary unions could be investigated. In fact, Von Hagen and Eichengreen
(1996) assemble data on ﬁscal policy restrictions in 49 countries. Interestingly, they ﬁnd that
37 of these countries impose restrictions on the ﬁscal policies of their subcentral governments.
This ﬁnding suggests that, in practice, policymakers are concerned with ﬁscal proﬂigacy of
the subcentral governments and have adopted measures to constrain such behavior.
5Our research here is related to a literature on ﬁscal policy in monetary unions, including
Giovannini and Spaventa (1991), Sibert (1992), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Cooper and
Kempf (2001c), Dixit and Lambertini (2001), and Uhlig (2002). Those most closely related
to our work here are Cooper and Kempf’s and Uhlig’s work. Cooper and Kempf focus mostly
on the gains to monetary union with commitment by the monetary authority and show that
without commitment, the monetary union may be undesirable. Uhlig develops a reduced-
form model in which there is a free-rider problem in ﬁscal policy. This free-rider problem
ends up reducing welfare, but not raising the inﬂation rate.
An extensive literature has discussed the gains from international cooperation in setting
ﬁscal policy. This literature shows that cooperation is desirable if a country’s ﬁscal policy
aﬀects world prices and real interest rates. (For details on this result, see the work of
Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Canzoneri and Diba (1991).) The kind of desirable cooperation
that this literature points to applies equally well to the relationship between, for example,
Germany and Canada as it does to that between Germany and Italy; it is not especially
related to countries being in a monetary union. Because the issues raised in this literature
are well-understood, we abstract from them here. We do so by considering models in which
the policies of the cooperating countries taken as a group do not aﬀect world prices and real
interest rates. In such models, there can be no gains to cooperation of this sort.
1. Theory
We begin with a general setup of a monetary union which makes explicit the logic by
which a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a free-rider problem.
Consider a world economy with N countries indexed i =1 ,...,N united in a union,
with one monetary authority that acts for them all. Each country has a continuum of
private agents indexed j ∈ [0,1], each of whom chooses an action xij. Let xi =
R
xij dj
denote the aggregate choice of actions by private agents in country i. The government of
country i chooses a nonmonetary policy τi, and the monetary authority of the union chooses
6ac o m m o ni n ﬂation rate for the union denoted π. The payoﬀst op r i v a t ea g e n t sa r e
V (τi,x ij,x i,π). (1)
The payoﬀ to the government of country i is the integral of the payoﬀs to the private agents
in that country,
Z
V (τi,x ij,x i,π) dj (2)




V (τi,x ij,x i,π) dj. (3)
Notice that we have assumed that the policies of individual governments do not directly
aﬀect the payoﬀs to other governments; thus, the only way governments in this economy
interact is through the eﬀect of their actions on the common inﬂation rate. We make this
assumption to abstract from standard nonmonetary policy linkages across countries, like
tariﬀs and taxes. These have been analyzed extensively in the literature and have no obvious
bearing on issues concerning a monetary union. (See, for example, the work of Chari and
Kehoe (1990).)
Typically, a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy arises when the monetary
authority cannot eﬀectively commit to an inﬂation policy. We will show that without eﬀective
commitment in a monetary union, there is a free-rider problem, which leads noncooperative
outcomes to diﬀer from a benchmark outcome with cooperation. We show that no such
problem arises when the monetary authority can commit.
We formalize the lack of commitment that drives the time inconsistency problem with
a no commitment game with the following timing. First, the governments choose τi, then
private agents choose xij, and ﬁnally the monetary authority chooses π. We focus on an
equilibrium in which all private agents within a country choose the same actions, so that
xij = xi for all i and j.
7A noncooperative equilibrium of this game is given by nonmonetary government policies
¯ τ =( τ1,...,τN), private agent decision rules xi(¯ τ) that depend on government policies, and
a monetary policy function π(¯ τ,¯ x) that depends on government policies ¯ τ and the private
agents’ decisions ¯ x =( x1,...,x N) such that (i) for all ¯ τ,¯ x, the policy π(τ,¯ x) maximizes the
monetary authority’s payoﬀ; (ii) for each private agent ij,f o ra l l¯ τ, xi(¯ τ) solves
max
xij
V(τi,x ij,x i(¯ τ),π(¯ τ,¯ x(¯ τ))) (4)
where ¯ x(¯ τ)= (x1(¯ τ),...,x N(¯ τ)); (iii) for each government i, given the policies of the other
governments i0, the private agents’ decision rules xi, and the monetary authority’s policy
rule π, the policy τi maximizes the payoﬀ to government i.
A cooperative equilibrium of this game is deﬁned similarly, with (iii) replaced by this:
(iii0) given the private agents’ decision rules xi and the monetary authority’s policy rule π,
the vector ¯ τ maximizes the sum of the payoﬀst ot h eg o v e r n m e n t s . (Notice that clauses (i),
(iii), and (iii0) require that the relevant policies be best responses, while clause (ii) has a
ﬁxed-point problem built into it.)
Throughout, we focus on symmetric equilibria, where in addition to all private agents
with a country choosing the same decision, all governments choose the same policy. We
characterize the equilibria by working backwards. Given government policies ¯ τ and private
decisions ¯ x, the monetary authority chooses π to maximize (3). The resulting monetary
policy function π(¯ τ,¯ x) satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
N X
i=1
V4(τi,x i,x i,π)=0 (5)
which in a symmetric equilibrium is simply V4 =0 . (Here V4 denotes the derivative of V
with respect to its fourth argument. We use similar notation throughout.)
Each private agent maximizes (1), taking as given the government policies ¯ τ, other
private agents’ decisions ¯ x, and the monetary policy function π(¯ τ,¯ x). The resulting best
response function Xi(τi,x i,π(¯ τ,¯ x)) satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
V2(τi,x ij,x i,π)=0 . (6)
8Let ¯ x(¯ τ)= (x1(¯ τ),...,x N(¯ τ)) denote the ﬁxed point of the best response function, that is,
xi(¯ τ)=Xi(τi,x i(¯ τ),π(¯ τ,¯ x(¯ τ))) for all i. (7)
In a noncooperative equilibrium, the government of country i maximizes V(τi,x i(¯ τ),
xi(¯ τ),π(¯ τ)) where Π(¯ τ)=π(¯ τ,¯ x(¯ τ)) denotes the monetary policy function π(¯ τ,¯ x) evaluated
at the private decision rules ¯ x(¯ τ). Then the government’s ﬁrst-order condition is







where ∂Π/∂τi = ∂π/∂τi +
PN
j=1(∂π/∂xj)(∂xj/∂τi). Notice that ∂Π/∂τi captures both the
direct eﬀect of changes in government policy τi on inﬂation and the indirect eﬀects through
changes in private agents’ decisions.
In a cooperative equilibrium, the governments jointly choose τ to maximize
N X
i=1
V(τi,x i(¯ τ),x i(¯ τ),Π(¯ τ)).
Taking the ﬁrst-order conditions and then imposing symmetry gives














We can use these conditions to show the following.
Proposition 1.( Free-riding without commitment) Suppose there is a unique cooper-
ative equilibrium with V3 6=0and ∂xj/∂τi 6=0 . Then the noncooperative and cooperative
policies without commitment diﬀer, and the cooperative equilibrium has strictly higher wel-
fare than the noncooperative equilibrium. If either V3 =0or ∂xj/∂τi =0in the cooperative
equilibrium, then the two equilibria coincide.
Proof. Substituting the ﬁrst-order conditions for the monetary authority and the pri-
















 =0 . (11)
Comparing (10) and (11), we see that the policies in the two equilibria are diﬀerent if and
only if both V3 6=0and ∂xj/∂τi 6=0in the cooperative equilibrium. Since it is feasible
for the governments in a cooperative equilibrium to choose the noncooperative policies, it
follows from the uniqueness of the cooperative equilibrium that welfare is strictly higher in
the cooperative equilibrium whenever the two equilibria diﬀer. Q.E.D.







where Xjx is the derivative of the ﬁx e dp o i n tm a pi n( 7 )w i t hr e s p e c tt oxj.N o t i c e t h a t
if private agents’ decisions do not depend on their predictions of inﬂation so that Xjπ =0
or the inﬂation rate does not depend on the government policies so that ∂Π/∂τj =0then
∂xj/∂τi =0and there is no free rider problem.
At a superﬁcial level, the free-rider problem seems to arise solely because inﬂation
confers a common cost on the members of the union while an individual government cares
only about the eﬀect of inﬂa t i o no ni t so w np a y o ﬀs . T h es o u r c eo ft h ef r e e - r i d e rp r o b l e m
is, however, subtler. For example, suppose that V3 =0 –say, because private agents take no
actions. Then the equilibria in the two regimes coincide even though individual governments
care only about the eﬀects of inﬂation on their own countries. In this example with V3 =0 ,
the two equilibria coincide because of an envelope argument. In the cooperative equilibrium,
the monetary authority chooses inﬂation to balance the costs and beneﬁt s ,s ot h a ta tt h e
margin, an incremental change in inﬂation has no eﬀect on welfare. Starting at this outcome,
a noncooperative government realizes that at the margin the induced eﬀect of its policies on
welfare through their eﬀect on inﬂation is zero. In both the cooperative and noncooperative
10equilibria, therefore, a government’s policies at the margin aﬀect only that government’s
welfare. Hence, there is no free-rider problem.
When V3 6=0and ∂xj/∂τi 6=0 , however, there is a free-rider problem. Starting at the
cooperative outcome, if country i changes its policies, then the monetary authority responds
by changing the inﬂation rate. At the margin, if we neglect the induced eﬀects on private
decisions x, this change has no eﬀect on welfare. The key is, however, that the induced
change in the inﬂation rate also induces changes in private decisions x. It is through this
channel that the free-rider problem occurs. A change in the government policy τi makes the
private agents in all the countries predict a change in inﬂation, and this predicted change
makes them change their actions. (Mechanically we can see this from equation (12) which
gives the change in private agent decisions in country j due to changes in government policy
in country i. For this change to be nonzero we need ∂Π/∂τi 6=0and Xjπ 6=0 .)W h e nV3 6=0
this change in private decisions implies that a change in government policy in country i
induces a change in welfare in country j and thus leads to a free rider problem. Later we
will illustrate the detailed economic channels of the free-rider problem in our applications of
this theory to three speciﬁc types of nonmonetary policies.
We now show that if there are no time inconsistency problems, then there are no free-
rider problems. There are no time inconsistency problems when there is some commitment or
reputational mechanism. For simplicity, here we simply assume that the monetary authority
can commit to its policies. A similar analysis would apply to the reputational equilibria that
support commitment in the repeated game version of the model.
The timing in the commitment game is as follows. First the monetary authority chooses
π, then governments choose τi, and ﬁnally private agents choose xij.
A noncooperative equilibrium of this game is given by a monetary policy π, government
policy functions τi(π), and private agent decision rules xi(π,¯ τ) such that (i) for each private
11agent ij,f o ra l lπ and ¯ τ, xi(π,¯ τ) solves
max
xij
V(τi,x ij,x i(π,¯ τ),π); (13)
(ii) for each government i, for all π, given the policies of the other governments τi0(π) and
the private agent decision rules xi(π,¯ τ), the policy τi(π) maximizes the payoﬀ to government
i; and (iii) given the government policy functions τi and the private agent decision rules xi,
the policy π maximizes the monetary authority’s payoﬀ.
A cooperative equilibrium of the commitment game is deﬁned similarly, but with (ii)
replaced by this: (ii0) for all π, given the private agent decision rules xi(π,¯ τ), the policy
τi(π) maximizes the sum of the payoﬀst ot h eg o v e r n m e n t s .
We then have
Proposition 2.( No free-riding with commitment) With commitment, the noncoop-
erative and the cooperative policies coincide and the welfare in the resulting equilibria is the
same.
Proof. Consider private agent optimality. From (13) it follows that the ﬁrst-order
condition for private agents in both equilibria is V2 =0and that xi(π,¯ τ) depends only on π




In the noncooperative equilibrium, the governments choose τi to maximize
V(τi,x i(π,¯ τ),x i(π,¯ τ),π).





Acting cooperatively, the governments choose τi to maximize
N X
i=1
V(τi,x i(π,¯ τ),x i(π,¯ τ),π).
12Using V2 =0and (14), we see that the ﬁrst-order condition for this problem reduces to (15).
Clearly, the noncooperative and cooperative solutions coincide. Thus, with commitment,
there is no free-rider problem. Q.E.D.
The intuition for the diﬀering results in the environments with and without commit-
ment is as follows. In both environments, a government in a given country i does not care
directly about the government policies or the private agent choices in any other country j.
Without commitment, government policies in other countries induce changes in the common
inﬂation rate, and thus induce changes in private agent choices in country i. This linkage
leads policies in country i to depend on government policy choices in country j. This subtle
linkage leads to a free-rider problem. With commitment, the links among governments in
diﬀerent countries are broken, and there is no free-rider problem.
In some of our applications, some of the private agents are not residents of any of the
countries. For example, in our application to ﬁscal policy, there are lenders who do not reside
in any of the countries. Propositions 1 and 2 generalize to such situations.
Consider a variant of the environment described here in which the behavior of private
agent ij is summarized by a best response function Xi(τi,π,x i), where xi =
R
xij dj. In the
noncommitment game, the private agent decision rules are summarized by a ﬁxed point of
the best response function, namely, a function xi(¯ τ) that solves
xi(¯ τ)=Xi(τi,π(¯ τ,¯ x(¯ τ)),x i(¯ τ)).
Here an analog of Proposition 1 holds with one slight modiﬁcation. The conditions under
which the noncooperative and cooperative policies without commitment diﬀer are
V2 + V3 6=0and ∂xj/∂τj 6=0 . (16)
Proposition 2 holds as stated.
In our application to bank regulation, the monetary authority has essentially a zero-
one decision on whether to bail out the banks. This feature implies that, even though the
13monetary authority is maximizing, it does not set V4 equal to zero. Inspecting (8) and (9),
we see that if V4∂Π/∂τi is not equal to zero, then an analog of Proposition 1 typically applies.
Proposition 2 holds as stated.
2. Applications
Now we apply this general theory to some particular examples of nonmonetary policies
which can lead to free-riding in monetary unions when monetary authorities cannot commit
to their policies.
2.1 Labor Market Policy
First we apply our theory to a type of nonmonetary policy that governments of members
of a monetary union control: labor market policy. For this application, we use the classic
model of time inconsistency in monetary policy due to Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983), in which ex post inﬂation reduces unemployment. We modify this
model to allow governments to set labor market policies which determine the natural rate
of unemployment. We show that the free-rider problem leads governments to adopt policies
that result in higher unemployment and inﬂa t i o nt h a nw o u l do c c u ri na ne ﬃcient allocation.
Consider the following modiﬁed version of Kydland and Prescott’s and Barro and
Gordon’s model. In this example, the natural rate of unemployment in country i, ¯ u(τi), is
aﬀected by labor market policies in that country, denoted by τi. For simplicity, let ¯ u(τi)=
¯ u−τi. The realized unemployment rate ui is determined by the natural unemployment rate
and the log of the real wage xi − π, which is the diﬀerence between the log of the nominal
wage and the log of the price level. Since initial prices are given, π is both the price level
and the inﬂation rate. Speciﬁcally,
ui = xi − π +¯ u(τi). (17)
Each private agent chooses a wage xij, and the wage in country i is given by xi =
R
xij dj.




















where a, b,a n dc are constants. The ﬁrst term in this objective function provides a target real
wage for the private agents, the second and the third terms reﬂect concerns over aggregate
unemployment and inﬂation, and the last term captures the cost of altering labor market
policies which aﬀect the natural rate of unemployment. Substituting for ui from (17) and
¯ u(τi)=¯ u − τi gives private agents these payoﬀs:


















The payoﬀ to government i is
R
V (τi,x ij,x i,π)di, and the payoﬀ to the monetary au-
thority is the sum of the governments’ payoﬀs. These payoﬀ functions ensure that private
agents choose their wages to be the expected value of inﬂation and that the monetary au-
thority cares about the average rate of unemployment. (To see why this assumption matters,
see the work of Chari et al. (1989).) In much of the literature, the payoﬀs to the private
agents are given (implicitly) by the ﬁrst term on the right side of (19) and the payoﬀst ot h e
monetary authority are given by the second and third terms. We choose to combine these
terms so that the governments and the monetary authority are benevolent.
Equilibria of the no commitment and commitment games in this world are deﬁned
exactly as in the theory section above. To show that there is a free-rider problem in the no
commitment game, we need show only that V3 6=0and ∂xi(¯ τ)/∂τj 6=0in the cooperative




xi + Na¯ u − a
P
τi
N(1 + a + b)
. (20)
Next we note that the private agent’s ﬁrst-order condition yields xi = π. Clearly, xi is the
same for all i, a n dw ed e n o t ei tb yx. Then x(¯ τ) solves the ﬁxed-point problem x(¯ τ)=











15Clearly, ∂xi(¯ τ)/∂τj = −a/bN 6=0as long as a is nonzero. To calculate the value of V3,
we need to solve for the cooperative equilibrium policies. It is straightforward to use the
monetary authority’s ﬁrst-order condition to show that the cooperative equilibrium policies





If ac¯ u 6=0 , we have that V3 6=0 . From Proposition 1, the following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 3.( Free-riding in labor market policies without commitment)I nt h e
game with no commitment, the noncooperative and cooperative equilibria diﬀer if ac¯ u is
nonzero and the cooperative equilibrium has strictly higher welfare than the noncooperative
equilibrium. If ac¯ u =0 , the two equilibria coincide.
If ac¯ u =0 , then there is no time inconsistency problem in monetary policy. This
condition is related to similar conditions in the literature following Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). In that literature, ¯ u is a constant, and there is only one
country. A standard result in that literature is that there is no time inconsistency problem
if a =0or if ¯ u =0 , that is, if the monetary authority does not have an incentive to reduce
unemployment below the natural rate. In our model in which the natural rate can be aﬀected
by labor market policies, if c =0 , then each government would simply set its policies so that
the natural rate is zero and there would be no time inconsistency problem in monetary policy.
Thus, Proposition 3 essentially says that whenever there is a time inconsistency problem in
monetary policy, there is a free-rider problem in labor market policy.











16Clearly, the noncooperative level of inﬂation πN is greater than the corresponding cooperative
level πC. Notice that the noncooperative inﬂation rate rises monotonically with the number
of countries N. In this sense, the free-rider problem gets worse as the number of countries
gets larger.
The free-rider problem can be eliminated by imposing constraints on the labor market
policies of member governments. The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary. (Labor market policy constraints and the free-rider problem)I nt h eg a m e
without commitment, if each government is required to set its labor market policy τi ≥ τC,
then the noncooperative equilibrium attains the cooperative benchmark.
Clearly, Proposition 2 applies to this environment, and thus with commitment, there
is no free-rider problem. Under commitment, the cooperative level of inﬂation is zero.
Notice that the constraints on labor market policy that eliminate the free-rider problem
in labor market policy also help mitigate the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy
because they lower inﬂation from πN to πC. They do not, however, eliminate the time
inconsistency problem since πC is still positive and thus πC is higher than the cooperative
level of inﬂation with commitment, namely zero.
2.2 Fiscal Policy
Now we apply our theory to a second type of nonmonetary policy: ﬁscal policy. Each
of the many governments in a monetary union issues nominal debt to smooth consumption.
The monetary authority chooses a common inﬂation rate. This inﬂation reduces the real
return on debt and eﬀectively serves as a kind of partial default. We show that when the
monetary authority cannot eﬀectively commit to its monetary policy, there is a free-rider
problem: governments issue too much debt, inﬂation is too high, and output is too low
relative to a cooperative benchmark. This free-rider problem can be solved by imposing
constraints on the amount of debt that governments can issue. Such constraints lead to the
17benchmark levels of inﬂation and output.
Consider a two-period model with N identical countries indexed i =1 ,...,N that are
small in the world economy. The countries are united in a monetary union. In period 0, the
countries start with an identical price level p0, which is given. Each country issues nominal
debt in period 0 to lenders who live outside of these countries. These foreign lenders are risk
neutral and have a discount factor of β. In period 1, the monetary authority determines the
unionwide monetary policy. We model monetary policy as the choice of the price level in
period 1,p 1. In each country, in period 0, output is a constant given by ω, while in period 1,
output y(π) is a decreasing and concave function of the common inﬂation rate from period 0
to period 1, denoted by π = p1/p0. We assume that y(π) satisﬁes the Inada conditions that
yπ(0) = 0 and yπ(∞)=−∞.
We now set up the individual country government budget constraints and objective
functions. The budget constraints of the government in country i are
p0ci0 = ω + qbi (23)
p1ci1 = p1y − bi (24)
where bi is nominal debt sold to foreign lenders at price q and ci0 and ci1 denote consumption
of the residents of country i in the two periods. The objective function of the country i
government is
U(ci0)+βU(ci1).
The model starts with p0 given, so setting p0 =1is convenient. A government’s period 1
b u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti s ,t h e n ,
ci1 = y(π) − bi/π.
We will assume that period 0 output, ω, is suﬃciently smaller than y(0), so that the govern-
ments have an incentive to borrow. The monetary authority’s objective function is the sum
of the objective functions of the governments.
18The timing of the model in period 0 is that ﬁrst the governments choose their debt
levels to foreign lenders bi, and then the price q of that debt is determined. In period 1,
the monetary authority chooses the common inﬂation rate π. We consider two equilibria: a
noncooperative equilibrium in which the governments simultaneously choose their debt levels
to maximize their own objective functions and a cooperative equilibrium in which the debt
levels are chosen to maximize the sum of the objective functions. This timing reﬂects the
idea that the monetary authority cannot commit to the policies it will follow. Speciﬁcally,
the monetary authority takes the debt levels ¯ b =( b1,...,b N) as given and then chooses the
inﬂation rate optimally. When choosing their debt levels, the governments recognize that
their choices aﬀect future inﬂation by inﬂuencing the actions of the monetary authority.
In both equilibria, we solve the model by starting at the end. In both regimes, the
problems of the monetary authority and the lenders are the same. Taking the debt levels as





U(y(π) − bi/π). (25)
Let π(¯ b) denote the resulting monetary policy function. Consider next the foreign lenders.
Since they are risk neutral, behave competitively, and have discount factor β, the debt price
function is given by
q(¯ b)=β/π(¯ b). (26)
In the noncooperative equilibrium, the government of country i, taking other countries’ debt
levels as given, solves
max
bi
U(ω + q(¯ b)bi) + βU(y(π(¯ b)) − bi/π(¯ b)). (27)






U(ω + q(¯ b)bi) + βU(y(π(¯ b)) − bi/π(¯ b))
i
. (28)
19A noncooperative equilibrium is given by a vector of debt levels ¯ b that solves (27), a
debt price function q that solves (26), and a monetary policy function π that solves (25). A
cooperative equilibrium is deﬁned similarly except that the vector of debt levels ¯ b solves (28).
This ﬁscal policy environment is a special case of the general setup that we discussed
at the end of the theory section. To see this, let τi = bi and xi = q. Then the payoﬀ to
government i is given by the integral over j of
V (τi,x ij,x i,π)=U(ω + xiτi) + βU(y(π) − τi/π).
Notice that the payoﬀ does not depend on the action xij of an individual private agent.
The monetary policy function in this case π(¯ τ) does not depend on private decisions ¯ x. The
private decision rule is given by xi(¯ τ)=β/π(¯ τ). The modiﬁed conditions (16) hold here.









is nonzero at the cooperative benchmark. We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.( Free-riding in ﬁscal policies, without commitment) In the game with
no commitment, the noncooperative and cooperative equilibria diﬀer and the cooperative
equilibrium has strictly higher welfare than the noncooperative equilibrium.
The natural presumption is that debt and inﬂation are higher in the noncooperative
equilibrium. It is possible to show that this presumption holds when y =¯ y − πα/σ with
σ>1. For this example, we can show that when there is no commitment, if the countries
in the noncooperative regime are constrained to keep their debt at or below the cooperative
levels, then they will achieve the cooperative outcome. Note that the cooperative outcome
w i t h o u tc o m m i t m e n th a sp o s i t i v ei n ﬂation. (This follows since at zero inﬂation yπ(0) = 0 so
that at the margin there is a gain from inﬂating away some nominal debt with an increase
in inﬂation.) When there is commitment, the cooperative outcome has zero inﬂation. Since
20the cooperative equilibrium without commitment has positive but lower inﬂation than the
noncooperative equilibrium without commitment, constraints on ﬁscal policy mitigate but
do not eliminate the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy.
Applying Proposition 2 to this environment, we know that once a monetary policy has
been committed to, binding constraints on future debt issues can only reduce welfare.
Propositions 2 and 4 imply that a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy is
at the heart of a free-rider problem in ﬁscal policy. They also imply that the question of
whether debt constraints are desirable is intimately connected to the extent to which the
monetary authority can commit to monetary policy. From Proposition 4 and the above
discussion, we know that as long as such commitment is not possible, appropriately chosen
debt constraints improve welfare while if such commitment is possible, debt constraints can
only reduce welfare.
The economy with commitment is broadly similar to the economies studied in an
extensive literature that has discussed the gains from international cooperation in setting
ﬁscal policy. (See, for example, the work of Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Canzoneri and Diba
(1991).) As noted in the introduction, this literature shows that cooperation is desirable if a
country’s ﬁscal policy aﬀects world prices and real interest rates. In our model, there are no
gains to cooperation under commitment because we have assumed that the monetary union
is small in the world in the sense that the world interest rate is independent of the ﬁscal
policy decisions of the union’s members.
Suppose, instead, we had considered a general equilibrium model with no outside
lenders, so that countries in the union constitute the entire world. Speciﬁcally, suppose
that each country chooses its spending level on a public good that beneﬁts its own residents
and ﬁnances the spending with debt and distorting taxes. In such a formulation, even with
commitment by the monetary authority, the noncooperative and cooperative equilibria do
not coincide. This is because any country’s spending decision aﬀects the world interest rate
21and, hence, other countries’ welfare. Since these types of gains to cooperation are not related
to the formation of a monetary union, we have chosen to abstract from them.
2.3 Bank Regulation
Now we apply our theory to a third type of nonmonetary policy: bank regulation.
Here the time inconsistency problem arises because the monetary authority cannot commit
to not bailing out insolvent banks. Government policy consists of determining the level of
regulation of banks. The free-rider problem leads to lax regulation of banks, frequent bank
bailouts, and a high rate of inﬂation. The general argument in Propositions 1 and 2, that
time inconsistency problems lead to free-rider problems, applies here, with the modiﬁcations
discussed at the end of the theory section.
We assume that depositors in banks are fully insured, banks have limited liability,
and the monetary authority bails out the depositors in insolvent banks. Deposit insurance
together with limited liability creates an incentive for banks to take on excessive risk. We
assume that governments regulate banks to limit risk-taking. In this application, the free-
rider problem leads governments to do too little regulation and banks to take on too much
risk compared to what they would do in the eﬃcient allocation.
The environment is as follows. The monetary union consists of N countries indexed
i =1 ,...,N. The aggregate state of the world economy is s ∈ {H,L}, where H denotes a
boom (or a high state) and L denotes a recession (or a low state). The probabilities of H
and L are µH and µL, respectively. Output is produced as follows. There are a large number
of projects in each country i, indexed by zi ∈ [0,1/2]. Ap r o j e c to ft y p ez yields a return
R per unit of investment when it succeeds and 0 otherwise. The probability of success in a
boom is pH(z)=( 1 /2)+z, and the probability of success in a recession is pL(z)=( 1 /2)−z.
We will show that in each country i only one type of project–say, zi–will be chosen. Since
each country has a large number of projects, total output in country i in state s ∈ {H,L} is
ps(zi)R. Notice that when projects with a higher value of z are chosen, the distribution of
22output is a mean-preserving spread of the output when projects with a lower value of z are
chosen.
This monetary union has many banks. Each bank can ﬁnance up to one unit of
investment. A bank in country i obtains funds from depositors who are paid an interest rate
ri. Banks have limited liability in that they must pay depositors only if bank receipts exceed
bank obligations. If bank receipts fall short of obligations, then banks pay zero, and the
monetary authority pays oﬀ the depositors by liquidating the bank’s assets and by printing
money to cover any shortfall. The government of country i =1 ,...,N can do some costly
supervision at a level of τi and prohibit banks from ﬁnancing projects with z>τ i.T h i s
supervision of bank activities is what will represent bank regulation in this world.
We now describe optimal behavior by banks for a given inﬂation rate π and given
supervision levels ¯ τ =( τ1,...,τN). A bank’s maximization problem is to choose which type
of project to fund. A bank in country i, taking the interest rate ri on its deposits and the
supervision level τi as given, chooses z to maximize proﬁts:
qHimax{pH(z)R − ri,0} + qLi max{pL(z)R − ri,0} (30)
subject to z ≤ τi.H e r eqHi and qLi are the prices in country i for one unit of consumption
in state H and L, respectively.
For some given policies π, ¯ τ, and state prices qsi, for i =1 ,...,N,s= H,L, a compet-
itive banking equilibrium consists of portfolio rules zi(τi) and deposit rates ri(τi) such that
(i) zi(τi) solves (30) given ri(τi) and (ii) proﬁts in (30) are zero. Then we have this:
Lemma. In a competitive banking equilibrium, zi(τi)=τi and ri = pH(zi(τi))R.
Proof. Since proﬁts are zero in equilibrium, each term in (30) is zero. We drop the
i subscript for simplicity. Since pH(z) ≥ pL(z),r= pH(z)R and pL(z)R − r ≤ 0. To see
that z = τ, suppose, by way of contradiction, that in equilibrium z<τ .Then increasing z
increases pH(z)R−r and, thus, increases the ﬁrst term in (30). The second term is unchanged
23since pL(z)R−r falls from a value of at most zero. Thus, increasing z increases proﬁts, which
contradicts proﬁt maximization. Q.E.D.





where ysi denotes output in country i and πs denotes the common inﬂation rate across
countries in state s. We assume that consumers cannot share risk across countries, so that
each consumer simply consumes the output of country i. We also assume that the utility
function is increasing in output and decreasing in the inﬂation rate. Output in each country
i is given by the returns from the banks’ projects less the costs of supervising banks, e(τi),
which is increasing in τi. Using the lemma, we know that all banks in a given country
choose projects of the same type zi, so that total output in country i is given by ys(zi,τi)=
ps(zi)R − e(τi).
The monetary authority is required to print money to bail out any bank which cannot
pay oﬀ its depositors, namely, when ri <p s(zi)R. An inﬂation rate of π raises revenues
of πM, where M is the initial money stock that we normalize to 1. Thus, the monetary
authority must set π so that
πs(¯ r, ¯ z)=
X
i
max{ri − ps(zi)R,0} (32)
where ¯ r =( r1,...,r N) and ¯ z =( z1,...,z N).




µsU(ys(zi(¯ τ),τi),πs(¯ r(¯ τ), ¯ z(¯ τ)))
along with a competitive banking equilibrium (¯ r(¯ τ), ¯ z(¯ τ)) and a monetary policy function
π that solves (32). A cooperative equilibrium is deﬁned similarly except that the vector of
supervision levels ¯ τ maximizes the sum of objective functions across countries.
24The logic of the general setup discussed at the end of the theory section can be applied
to this bank regulation environment. To see how, let xi be the vector (xir,x iz)=( ri,z i) and
π be the vector (πL,πH). To keep the notation simple, we let the monetary authority either
bail out all insolvent banks by setting πs = πs(¯ r,¯ z) or not bail out any insolvent bank by
setting πs =0 . We let the indicator variable d =1if there is a bailout and d =0if not.
Since banks within each country are identical, we need only consider a representative bank





µsU(ys(zi,τi),πs)) if either ri ≤ ps(zi)R or d =1
and otherwise equals an arbitrarily large negative number, say −K.T h i s p a y o ﬀ has the
feature that the payoﬀ to the government coincides with the payoﬀ in (31) if either the
banks in that country are solvent or there is a bailout. The payoﬀ to the monetary authority
is then
P
i V (τi,x i,π). Since the cost of not bailing out insolvent banks is arbitrarily large,
the monetary authority ﬁnds bailing out all insolvent banks optimal.
Consider applying the extension of Proposition 1. Government i’s ﬁrst-order condition






























This is the analog of (9) and uses the feature that here neither ri nor zi varies with τj. Since
Vπ 6=0and ∂Π/∂τi 6=0 , policies under cooperation and noncooperation diﬀer. We have
proven the following proposition:
Proposition 5. (Free-riding in bank regulation without commitment) The noncooper-
ation and cooperation policies without commitment diﬀer and the cooperative equilibrium
has strictly higher welfare than the noncooperative equilibrium.
25The mechanism that leads to the free-rider problem here is as follows. When bank
supervision by a government slackens, its banks take on riskier portfolios, and in a recession,
the monetary authority must make larger bailouts. These larger bailouts lead to higher
inﬂation and lower welfare. In a noncooperative equilibrium, each government trades oﬀ the
gains from slacker supervision against the cost it bears from higher inﬂation. In particular,
each government ignores the costs on others of the higher inﬂation that its actions induce.
In a cooperative equilibrium, the gains from slacker supervision are traded oﬀ against the
costs that all bear from higher inﬂation. These tradeoﬀsl e a dt oh i g h e ri n ﬂation and lower
welfare in the noncooperative equilibrium.
One way to mitigate the free-rider problem with regard to this type of nonmonetary
policy is to have countries set a mutually agreed upon level of bank supervision. Here that
level is the cooperative level. Finally, Proposition 2 holds as stated for this environment, so
that when there is commitment by the monetary authority, there is no free-rider problem.
3. Conclusion
We have argued that in the context of monetary unions, a time inconsistency prob-
lem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free-rider problem in the setting of member
governments’ nonmonetary policies. The free-rider problem can be eliminated by setting con-
straints on the nonmonetary policies. Such constraints not only lead to better nonmonetary
policies; they also lead to better monetary policies.
Our analysis also shows that the desirability of constraints on various nonmonetary
policies in monetary unions depends critically on the extent of commitment of the union’s
monetary authority. If that monetary authority can commit to its policies, constraints can
only impose costs. If the monetary authority cannot commit, then there is a free-rider
problem, and constraints may be desirable.
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